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A TEST OF NUTRITIONAL QUALITY SIGNALING
IN FOOD MARKETS PRIOR TO
IMPLEMENTATION OF MANDATORY LABELING
ELIZA M. MOJDUSZKA AND JULIE A. CASWELL
In May 1994, new nutrition labeling regulations went into effect in the United States requiring
mandatory disclosure of information on the nutritional content of foods. This article uses Grossman's model of totally effective quality signaling to evaluate whether markets were effective in
information provision prior to the new regulation. If markets were effective in providing information to consumers on the nutritional quality of foods the new regulation would be unnecessary. The
results of the logistic model, where the probability of voluntary information disclosure is linked to
the nutritional quality of food products and their prices, indicate that private quality signaling was
not reliably at work in food markets prior to implementation of the mandatory nutrition labeling
regulation.
Key words: food markets, nutrition labeling, quality signaling.

The promulgation of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) in 1990

Darby and Karni, we can distinguish three

groups of product attributes that explain

marked a major step toward stricter nutrition how consumers learn about the quality of

labeling regulation in the United States. The the products they purchase: search attribute
NLEA went into effect in May 1994, requir- (consumers can determine product quality
ing mandatory nutrition labeling in the format the point of purchase by looking at the
of a standardized nutrition information panelproduct, examining, or researching it), experithat shows the amounts of the macro- and
ence attributes (consumers cannot determine
micronutrients found in a food. In addition,
product quality until they buy the good and
voluntary nutrient content and health claims
use it), and credence attributes (the quality
that are made outside the standardized inforcannot be learned even after consumption).
mation panel are circumscribed by the law.
As Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) argue, the
Prior to implementation of the NLEA, nutrinutritional attributes of specific brands of
tion labeling was provided by manufacturers
food should in general be viewed as creon a voluntary basis and government requiredence attributes. Therefore, if manufacturer
ments concerning nutrient content and health
are required to provide reliable information
claims made on food packages were much
to consumers, nutritional quality can become
less stringent.

a search attribute consumers can evaluate at

The NLEA relies heavily on requirements
the point of purchase.
for information disclosure in an attempt toHigh-quality products may not be supplied
encourage consumers to demand foods with
in markets with imperfect and asymmetric

better nutritional profiles and to inspire maninformation. If consumers have limited infor-

ufacturers to produce higher quality foods.
mation about product quality, the markets
Information regulation might be very valumay not exist or if they exist, the quality
able in the case of nutrition because conproduced may be lower than in a world of
sumers often cannot accurately evaluate the
perfect information. Market performance in
nutritional quality of specific brands of food
the provision of high-quality goods depends
products. Following Nelson (1970, 1974) and
greatly on the effectiveness of quality signaling by sellers to buyers.
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may not
result help us understand how markets
forbe known to producers. Models
by Akerlof, Grossman, and other
quality work. For example, in hisdeveloped
"market

for lemons" model Akerlof considers a case

researchers explore the conditions under

where sellers cannot signal quality effectively
which information on product quality could
so that the market may disappear completely
be effectively supplied by markets and which
or only the lowest quality products may
be for products of varying quality to be
allow
sold. On the other hand, Grossman's signalsold. Specifically, in his model Grossman
assumes that manufacturers can make ex-post
ing model provides quite different results due
verifiable claims, that verification of these
to assumptions of totally effective, truthful,
claims is costless, that manufacturers never
and costless quality signaling and verification
lie,of
and that consumers know that manufacof claims. Here markets for varying levels
turers will make the most favorable claim
quality exist and operate smoothly.
Akerlof's model of totally ineffective qualpossible for their products. Manufacturers

ity signaling is not applicable to nutrition
who can make a quality claim (e.g., effeclabeling because a level of voluntary and
tively use a nutrition information panel on
truthful labeling occurred prior to the NLEA.
their product) will do so and consumers will
Grossman's model provides an attractive
assume that any firm not making a claim
framework for testing the effectiveness
oflow-quality products. Thus, consumers can
has
the voluntary quality signaling process learn
for about a product's attributes before purnutrition because its final outcome depicts
chase by examining the product's claims or
full transmission of information to consumers
lack of them. In the period 1992-93 when
and a well functioning market for quality.nutrition labeling was voluntary, Grossman's
Markets may supply reasonably adequatemodel would have been effectively at work
information to consumers on product qual-if high nutritional profile products carried

ity. If markets were effective in provision of
nutrition information panels and those with
information, establishing new regulations for
low nutritional quality did not. Thus, the
mandatory nutrition labeling would have litabsence of nutrition labeling might be a
tle effect on the demand and supply of food.
good indicator of the low nutritive value of
The new regulations would, in fact, be unnecproducts.
essary. The impact of the NLEA depends on Here product quality is defined, using Lanhow the information environment changed
caster's approach, as a bundle of characafter its implementation.

teristics (attributes) that determine the per-

As a means to begin to assess the impact
formance of a given product (Lancaster).
of the NLEA, we use Grossman's totallySimilarly, the term quality of a food prodeffective quality signaling thesis to test the
uct is used to refer to overall characteroverall effectiveness of markets in provid-istics (attributes) possessed by a product,
ing information on the nutritional qualityfor example, food safety, nutritional, value,
of food products in the period from 1992
package, and process attributes (Hooker and
to 1993, when labeling was voluntary. After
Caswell). The nutritional quality of a food
1994, quality signaling was totally effective in product is viewed as an objective measure
the sense that nutrition labels were mandaand is expressed by the amounts of differtory and available on virtually all packaged
ent nutrients contained by the product. Large
food products sold in the United States. First,
amounts of desirable nutrients (e.g., fiber,

we outline the totally effective quality signalprotein, vitamins) in a product indicate its

ing hypothesis. Second, we specify and estihigh nutritional quality while large amounts
mate an empirical model where the probaof undesirable nutrients (e.g., fat, cholesterol,

bility of a voluntary information disclosuresodium)
is
indicate its low nutritive value.
linked to the nutritional quality of food prod-If the market's operation results in full

ucts and their prices. The final section proquality disclosure to consumers, government
vides a summary of results and conclusions.

regulation of nutrition labeling would be

The Totally Effective Quality
Signaling Hypothesis

unnecessary. As Ippolito and Mathios (1990,
1993) suggested, this process would place the

fewest constraints on manufacturers while

still providing full and accurate information
to consumers. In addition, Caswell noted that
Many quality attributes of market goodsif
are
this process was at work, we would expect
not known to consumers and in some cases
to find nutrition labeling on products with
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good nutrition worry
profiles
and
about having too
much ofabsent
rather than
with less desirable
profiles.
previ
too little--would
be negative, A
showing
that
of national brand
meat
and
poultry
the higher
their levels
in a food
the lower
conducted in 1991
by of
Public
Voice
the probability
the nutrition information
and Health Policy
could
be interp
panel being
present. Manufacturers
of low
show such a pattern
Ther
nutritional (Ingersoll).
quality brands would not want
to
hypothesis

the

disclose
information
to consumers. On
tested
is this
that
voluntary

la

other hand, the estimated
coefficientspr
of
nutritional the
content
of food

the United States conformed to Grossman's

desirable nutrients such as fiber, protein, and

quality signaling thesis prior to implementavitamins would be positive because it would
tion of the NLEA and that this resulted in an
be in the manufacturers' interest, in order
information pattern in which products with
to maximize profits, to disclose information
higher nutritional quality were labeled and
about the high nutritional quality of their
brands.
those with lower quality were not.
Nutrient content variables are used to mea-

sure the nutritional quality of foods in this

Empirical Specification
of the Logit Model

test of the Grossman thesis. An alternative

approach is to construct and compute composite indexes of nutritional quality for each
product examined and use them as the
To test the hypothesis we constructed food
an
independent
variable. Utilizing this estimaempirical model where the presence of a

tion technique might provide further insights.
nutrition information panel on a food prodHowever, few indexes of overall nutritional
economic and product profile variables. quality
This exist. In addition, this approach would
assume
relationship can be represented by a statisti- that consumers compute an overall
nutritional quality index for food products
cal model:
uct is assumed to be a function of certain

k

j=1
(1) = ai + E jXij + 3k+lPi
+ ei,

i=1,... , N

rather than looking at nutrients separately.

Price represents the only economic vari-

able that was included in the logit model. This

variable was used as a proxy for manufac-

turers' production costs (marginal cost). Economic theory suggests that it is more costly
where YI represents the presence of to
a nutriproduce higher quality products and theretion information panel (food label) on
the consumers
ith
fore
have to pay higher prices
food product, Xij is the amount of nutrient
j In addition, Frazao and Allshouse
for them.

in product i, Pi is the price of the ith found
product,
that nutritionally improved versions of
foods
had higher prices than regular versions.
a is the intercept, pj and [k+1 are the coef-

ficients to be estimated, and ei is a stochastic
Thus, if higher quality products were labeled
error term. The dependent variable,(Grossman),
Yi, is a
the estimated coefficient of the
discrete (binary) manufacturer's choice
variprice
variable should be positive.

able and is defined as YI = 1 if a nutrient con-

tent panel is present on the ith product, and

Y = 0 if not. Due to difficulties in the use

Data

of standard linear regression techniques for
the discrete choice model, several alternative
This study is based on a unique data set that
procedures such as probit and logit models
includes a complete census of all products
were described by Maddala. The logit model
in the most popular package size offered in
is used in this study.
thirty-three food product categories in a repThe explanatory variables are economic
resentative super-store in New England for
variables such as prices of food products,
each
as well as nutrition profile variables such
asof the years 1992-99. The data are part
ofand
an ongoing survey designed to track the
calories, fat, cholesterol, sodium, fiber,
other macro- and micronutrient variables. If
evolution of product offerings and label content. The data set, which records changes in
the data supported totally effective qualcontent and in health and nutrition
ity signaling, the estimated coefficients nutrition
of
undesirable nutrients such as fat, cholesterol,claims on food products, includes between

and sodium-nutrients that most consumers

857 and 1,025 branded and private label
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Table 1. Number
products for each year. Each product
cat-of Brands Considered for

the Logit for
Model
egory is a major food group including,
example, cookies, desserts, entrees,
packaged
Number of Brands

meats, cereal, soups, pasta sauces, and oils.

1992 1993

Total
987
982
Each food category contains from
three to
With
nutritio
eighty-three different brands in each
of the
With constructed nutrient content
years. Fresh commodities were excluded
from
values
272
252
the study. The data were taken directly from
Excluded 31 26
food labels and provide information on the

amounts of specific nutrients contained in dif-

ferent food products as well as their prices.

To estimate the logit model we
used the method for
best
data for the years 1992 and 1993.
In these
thermore,
as C

years nutrition labeling was voluntary
and
pointed
out, th
determined by manufacturers. Labels were
stagnant in prod
presented in the form designedin
and reguthe nutritive
lated by FDA requirements established in
If a product ha

1975. Although the NLEA was passed
by
content

claims

in

the U.S. Congress in 1990, the final regulamissing 1992 nu
tions were not published until January 1993,
with the values
with the implementation deadline set for May
ried a nutrient
1994. Therefore, the data for the period 19921994 if the pro
93 can be used to test the effectiveness of
tion informatio
nutritional quality signaling prior to the new
that nutritional c
regulation.
icantly over the

In order to estimate an empirical model
as specified in the previous section, it was
necessary to have nutrient values for all
products, including those with and without
nutrient content panels. The values of the
nutrient content variables (Xij's) were miss-

ing for products that did not carry nutrition

information panels so these values had to

of the 987 brands in 1992 and 704 of the
982 brands in 1993 carried nutrition infor-

mation panels (see table 1). Nutrition con-

tent values were constructed for 272 brands

in 1992 and 252 brands in 1993. In 1992,
thirty-one brands were excluded from the
analysis, twenty-eight because it was diffi-

cult to construct their missing values and
three because the shortening category was
excluded from the analysis since its nutri-

be constructed in order to regress the binary
choice dependent variable Yi on the independent nutrient content variables Xij's. Without
this construction, it would not be possible to
run regressions to test whether poor nutritional profiles affected the probability of a
label being present. In 1992, approximately

ent content was very uniform and there were

nutrition information panel, while in 1993 this

would be desirable to test whether the orig-

ents, 100 product brands with nutrition infor-

However, it was impossible to perform this
test because the dependent variable Yi was

30% of branded products did not have a

percentage decreased to 28%.
To construct the missing values of nutrimation panels were randomly selected across
various food categories and then the nutri-

ent contents of the same brands were com-

few brands. In 1993, twenty-six brands were
excluded (twenty-three due to data difficulties and three shortening brands).1

To assure the validity of the results, it

inal and filled data sets could be pooled.

always equal to zero for products without

labels and always equal to one for products
with labels. Therefore, for purposes of the

logit model, we assumed that original and
pared in 1992, 1993, and 1994. Out of 100
replaced sets could be pooled.
brands selected, about 92% had the same
nutrient composition in 1992, 1993, and 1994.
Based on this result, we concluded that con1Another data set published by the U.S. Department of Agristructing the missing values of nutrients forculture (USDA) was also considered to construct nutrient conproducts that did not carry nutrition infor-tent values for products without nutrition information panels

mation panels in earlier years (e.g., 1992)(Agriculture Handbook No. 8). However, the USDA data source
did not have complete information on the nutritional composibased on our own data for the same prod-tion of specific brands of foods and was very difficult to match

uct in later years (e.g., 1993 or 1994) was thewith our data, which would have introduced inaccuracies.
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Model Estimation
and Results
The complete data
set
containing
two food product categories was gro
twenty food groups,
based
onfood
nutr
The data set included
thirty-two
prodfile and the results
of To
tests
for
po
uct categories.
test whether
data could

sented in the next section. The number of
nutrient content variables included in the

be pooled across categories and years, we

applied a procedure used by Ben-Akiva. The
test statistic did not reject the null hypothelogit model for each group varies according
sisfor
that some food product categories could
to the importance of specific nutrients
be pooled into food groups. Those catethe entire group, collinearity among nutrient
content variables, and data availability. gories
Many that could not be pooled with any
other category were treated as single (indiof the characteristics listed on the nutrition
vidual) groups in the estimation of the logit
information panel are highly correlated and

model resulting in twenty groups overall
the inclusion of a large number of characterbeing included in the analysis.2 In addition,
istics would provide unreliable estimates due
the test statistic failed to reject the null
to multicollinearity. Therefore, it was neceshypothesis
of equal coefficients in 1992 and
sary to select a reduced group of least linearly
1993 for all thirty-two categories.

dependent nutritional characteristics to use.
Estimates were obtained for a total of
sixteen of the twenty food groups. Table 2
on the multicollinearity diagnostics suggested
reports estimates of the explanatory variables
by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (see also Johnhypothesized to affect the probability of the
son, Reimer, and Rothrock, and Belsley).
presence of a nutrition information pane
The variables chosen represent nutritional
on food products. The table also includes
attributes of foods that are important the
in U.S.
number of all observations in each food
diets, as indicated by inclusion on thegroup,
NLEA likelihood ratio test statistics, Madnutrition panel, and that are least collinear
dala R2's, and percentage of right predic-

The variable selection criterion was based

(Mojduszka).

tions. Because Yi, the dependent variable, was
Calorie, fat, and sodium content variables
equal to 1 for all of the observations in
were included in the model for almost all
three groups (yogurt, margarine and spreads,
of the food groups examined. The saturated
and cereal) it was impossible to obtain estifat, fiber, and sugar variables were usedmates
only for these groups. In addition, for the
for a few food groups because information
salted snacks group 182 brands were labeled
on these nutrients was not required andand
very
only seven brands did not have nutrition
information panels; therefore the regresoften not reported on nutrient content
pan-

els in 1992 and 1993. The cholesterol content
variable was included in the estimations for

sion results would be unreliable due to the

lack of variation in the dependent variable.
The logit model was estimated for fourteen
only five groups because it was highly correlated with the fat content variable or its valfood groups by a maximum likelihood procedure. The logistic and probit models were
ues were close to zero and did not vary.
The NLEA requires that the amounts ofrejected for oils and soft drinks based on crinutrients listed in the "Nutrition Facts" panelteria for assessing model fit and predictive
be based on standardized serving sizes to power, including the Akaike information and
help consumers understand and compare the the Schwartz criteria (see also Maddala; Pregibon; Landwehr, Pregibon, and Shoemaker).
nutritional values of different foods. This was
The
linear probability model was applied to
not the case prior to 1994 so the levels
these
groups, with regressions run using the
of nutrient content variables of each prodordinary least squares method.
uct in our data set were standardized based
on serving sizes corresponding to the ref-

2 The
erence amounts consumed on average by

twenty food groups are cookies, desserts (ice

cream/frozen yogurt and novelties), baked goods (frozen and

an adult person, as specified and defined fresh
in sweet baked goods), salted snacks (crackers, corn chips,
the new nutrition labeling regulations. potato
As chips, and other salted snacks), entrees (single serving
frozen entrees/frozen dinners, family pack frozen entrees, shelf
Caswell reported, manipulation (shrinking)
stable entrees, and frozen pizza), meats (processed meats except

of serving sizes was a significant issue in prodbacon), bacon, cheese (hard and processed), yogurt, cereal,

soup, pasta sauces, vegetables (canned tomatoes, other canned
uct categories with higher calorie, fat, and
vegetables, and frozen vegetables), juices (frozen, bottled, and
sodium before the new regulation went into
refrigerated), soft drinks, condiments, salad dressings, margarines

effect.

and spreads, butter and peanut butter, and oils.

Table 2. Logit Model Estimations for Selected Food Groups, 1992-93
Coefficienta

Variable Cookies Desserts Baked Goods Entrees Meats B

Calories 0.0030 -0.0375* 0.0003 -0.0113* -0.0313 0.000

(0.1050) (-2.7822) (0.8124) (-2.1497) (-0.9322) (0.73

Fat 0.1480 -0.1433* 0.0036 -0.1186* -0.1532* -0.7800

(0.6823) (-3.2281) (0.1521) (-2.2370) (-3.1631) (-1.26

Saturated
(-1.9090)

fat

-0.6018

/

/

/

Cholesterol 0.1456 / -0.0121 / 0.0312 -0.09

(2.4336) (-1.4533) (0.7966) (-0.4031

Sodium 0.0049 0.0144* 0.0033 0.0023* -0.0001 0.00

(0.5733) (2.1322) (0.9954) (2.0429) (-0.0534) (0.5
Fiber
/
/
/
/
/
Sugar / 0.0357* -0.0024 /

Protein

/

/

(2.3211) (-0.8992)

/

0.2431*

VitaminA
VitaminC

/
/

0.1371

/

-0.2

(3.8121) (0.6528)

/
/

/
/

/
/

/
/

Price 2.7049* 1.2144* 0.0302 -0.0525 -0.3867 3.075

(3.0022) (2.1082) (0.0795) (-0.2452) (-1.5344) (1.44

Constant -5.1993 -1.7533 0.5823 0.3845 2.5833 -3.7
n

(-1.5331) (-1.8052) (0.4021) (0.5389) (1.7553) (-0.4

86

113

59

162

86

31

X2 24.4851 62.6433 3.0022 48.8260 15.1241 16.907

Maddala R2 0.2503 0.4452 0.0542 0.2659 0.1704 0.4

% of right predict. 0.8235 0.7966 0.5822 0.7975 0.6856 0

Table 2. Continued.
Coefficienta

Variable Pasta Sauces Vegetables Juices Soft Drinksb Condiments Salad Dre

Calories 0.0214 0.0017 -0.0288* -0.0099* 0.0825 0.
(0.6671) (0.1626) (-2.4822) (-12.922) (1.1224) (0.0178
Fat -0.1323 / / / 1.2363 -0.3482 0.04
(-0.3941) (1.5571) (-1.0268) (0.6

Saturated

fat

/

/

/

/

/

/

Cholesterol
/
/
/
/
/
Sodium -0.0010 0.0007* 0.0002 0.0022* -0.0149 -0
(-0.4420) (2.0877) (0.0882) (2.3694) (-1.4471) (-0.6444)
Fiber
/
0.3648*
/
/
/
(4.1806)

Sugar

/

/

0.0421

0.0071*

(1.1275) (2.4759)
Protein
/
/
/
/
/
Vitamin
A
/
0.0053
/
/
(1.3512)
Vitamin
C
/
0.03101
0.0063
/
(1.0654) (1.7211)

Price -1.1393 -0.6325 0.2679 0.0026 -1.7196* -0.1610

(-1.3016) (-1.3922) (0.6254) (0.4777) (-2.4048) (-0.249

Constant 2.7713 -1.6022 1.4800 0.8039* 1.2051 3.9200
n

(1.0693) (-1.3104) (1.1354) (7.5041) (0.8245) (1.849

51

92

95

78

58

72

X2 2.9871 39.9766 12.8921 167.610(F) 46.3273 34.1114

Maddala R2 0.0569 0.3542 0.1269 0.8875(R2) 0.5501 0.377
% of right predict 0.8235 0.7682 0.6421 0.8966 0.8056
* Significant at the 0.05 level (two-tail test).
a Wald statistics are in parentheses.

Linear probability model estimation.
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First, likelihood ratio tests were conducted
of fat content did not decrease the probabilnutrition labeling. This result suggests
to test the significance of the effectity
ofof
the
that
disclosure of information on the nutrinutritional quality of foods and their
prices
on voluntary nutrition labeling. For ent
all content
the of oils did not conform to Grossthesis. It is noteworthy that the oils
food groups except baked goods, pastaman's
sauces,
group consists of high fat content products.
and butter and peanut butter, the likelihood
Therefore, it would be more appropriate to
ratio test statistics rejected the null hypothetestthan
how the content of saturated, polyunsatsis that the explanatory variables other
or other fatty acids affected the probthe intercept had no impact on theurated,
manuability
of voluntary information disclosure in
facturer's choice probability. The logit
model
this group.
Information on saturated fat was
correctly predicted between 58 and 90%
of
the observations for all of the food available
groups.for most of the brands and the satfat content variable was included in
The values of the Maddala R2 statistic,urated
a meathe estimation
of the linear probability model
sure of model performance, ranged from
a
low of 0.05 for the butter and peanut
butfor
the oils group. However, its effect on the
ter group to a high of 0.55 for theprobability
condiof nutrition labeling was statistiments group. These results provide evidence
cally insignificant. This might be due to higher
between the fat and saturated fat
that the nutritional quality and price collinearity
of food
had a significant impact on the voluntary
disvariables.
The coefficients on fat among the
closure of information in thirteen of eight
twenty
remaining food groups were insigniffood groups considered in this study. icant and thus did not support Grossman's
Our analysis of the estimates of thethesis.
logisThe saturated
fat variable was included
tic model begins with horizontal (nutrient
by
nutrient) analysis. The calorie variable
was
in one additional group (cookies) and the
variable was included in five
considered in all of the food groups cholesterol
except
oils. The significant (at the 5% level) and
neg-(cookies, baked goods, meats, bacon,
groups
ative coefficients on the calorie variable in
and cheese) for the logit model estimation.
effect of these nutrients on the manuthe desserts, entrees, cheese, juices, andThe
soft
drinks groups showed that manufacturers
of
facturer's
choice probability was not signifiproducts containing more calories werecant
less in any of these cases except for choleslikely to disclose their nutrient content levels.
terol in cheese. This might result from high
This result is consistent with a totally effeccollinearity between fat and saturated fat,
and between fat and cholesterol.
tive quality signaling model. In the remaining
Another macronutrient variable, sodium,
ten food groups the calorie content variable
was included in the model for all of the
was insignificant suggesting that the calorie
level in these foods did not affect the probfood groups except oils. The estimated coefability of a nutrition information panel ficients
being
on sodium for food groups such as
present on food packages. This result is incondesserts, entrees, cheese, vegetables, and soft
sistent with the totally effective qualitydrinks
sigwere statistically significant but posnaling thesis.
itive. This suggests that food products with
Fat, an important macronutrient variable,
low sodium content within these food groups

was included in the model for thirteen food

were not more likely to carry a nutrition label

groups. The estimated coefficients on than
fat other products. In this case, Grossman's
among the food groups of desserts, entrees,
hypothesis was not supported by our data

meats, and cheese were statistically significant
The sodium content of food products in these

and negative. This suggests that food prodgroups did not have a negative effect on the
ucts in these groups with lower fat content
probability that these products were labeled
were more likely to carry a nutrition informafor their nutrient levels. However, desserts,
tion panel than other products. Within these
cheese, and soft drinks, as well as vegetables,
high fat foods, the fat level had a signifido not belong to high sodium content groups.
The
cant and negative effect on the probability
ofmeans of sodium content for these food
nutrition labels being present on food prodgroups were 60, 264, 37, and 302 mg per servuct packages. On the other hand, for the ing,
oils respectively. This compares, for examgroup, the estimated coefficient on the fat
ple, to the soup group where the mean level
variable was highly significant and positive,
of sodium was 954 mg per serving. In the
which means that in this group a higher level
soup group as well as in the remaining ten
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groups, the coefficient
on sodium
w
late into a higher probability
of information
disclosure.3
tically insignificant
and did not con

Grossman's model.

Yatchew and Griliches have examined the

issue of potential problems associated with
One of the most important desirable nutriomission of a significant variable in the setents, fiber, was considered in the vegetables
group only and its effect was significantting
and of probit and logit models. They found

positive which means that the higherthat
theeven

if the omitted variable is uncor-

related with the included one, the coeffifiber content the more likely it was that vegcient on the included variable will be inconetable products carried nutrition labels in the
Any of the three standard methods
years 1992-93. The fiber variable was sistent.
not
of
hypothesis
testing (i.e., the Wald, likeliincluded in the model for any other food
hood ratio, or Lagrange multiplier tests) can

groups because of missing data problems.
be used to analyze the specification prob-

Sugar was considered in the desserts, baked
lem associated with omitting price from the

goods, juices, and soft drinks groups. estimations.
The

The likelihood ratio test shows

estimated coefficient for the sugar content
what happened when the price variable was
variable was positive and significant in excluded
the
from the model for the cookies,
desserts and soft drinks groups, which means
desserts, condiments, and oils groups. In all of
that higher sugar content did not decrease
these foods, the price variable was significant.
the probability of a label being present on
The null hypothesis tested was that 3prce = 0
products in these groups.
for each of the above four groups. The likeliThe protein variable was considered hood
for ratio (LR) statistics were computed as:

the estimation of the logit model for entrees,

meats, cheese, and soups. For the entrees,
(2) LR = -2[ln L, - In L]
cheese, and soup groups estimated coeffi-

where In Lr and In L are the log-likelihood
cients on protein were significant; however,
functions evaluated at the restricted and
they were positive for two groups: entrees
estimates, respectively. For all
and soups, whereas in the cheese group unrestricted
the
four categories, the hypothesis that the coefeffect of protein on the probability of nutri-

on the price variable was zero was
tion labeling was negative. For meats ficient
the

rejected. Thus, if the price variable was not
coefficient on the protein variable was posi-

considered for the estimation of the logit

tive but insignificant. Lastly, two other desirmodel the estimated coefficients of the other
able nutrients, vitamin A and vitamin C, were
included variables would be inconsistent.4

included for vegetables and juices. In both
To be able to draw conclusions about the

cases the estimated coefficients were not sta-

tistically significant.
Price is included as an economic variable

overall effectiveness of private quality signal-

ing, it is also useful to analyze the impact of

nutritional quality on labeling by food groups
in the estimation of the logit model for all(vertical
of
analysis). As noted earlier, within
the food groups as a proxy for manufacturers'
the four food groups of salted snacks, cereal,

production costs. The estimated coefficient
yogurt, and margarine and spreads, almost

of the price variable was positive andall
sigproducts were labeled so there was no

nificant in two groups, cookies and desserts.
Within these two groups products with higher

3 Inclusion of the price variable as an independent (exogenous)
a question whether the estimates obtained from
a
single equation method suffer from simultaneous equation bias,
groups,

prices were more likely to have nutrition
variable creates

information panels. In two additional
which would be the case if the price variable was determined
condiments and oils, the estimated coeffiendogenously. A Hausman test was used for independence of
the regressors and stochastic error term, to examine whether the
cient of price was significant but negative,
estimated coefficients are unbiased (Smith, Even). This test, using
which indicated that higher priced products
annual total expenditures on advertising (in million of dollars) on
each brand for the cookies, soft drinks, and soup categories as an
within these groups were less likely to carry
extra exogenous variable, indicated that there is no simultaneity
a nutrition label. For the remaining twelve
bias and that the maximum likelihood estimates for cookies, soft
drinks, and soups are consistent. We were unable to test the other
food groups the price variable was not signifproduct categories due to data availability.
icant. The above results suggest that, overall,
4 When the price variable was excluded from the model, the
there was no significant relationship between
magnitudes of the estimated coefficients changed. In addition,

the coefficient
prices (manufacturers' cost) and voluntary

disclosure of information on the nutritional

on the sodium variable in the condiments group
changed sign from negative to positive but remained insignifi-

cant. The significance of the estimated coefficients did not change
of the four food groups.

in any
quality of food. Higher prices did not trans-
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calories as
relationship between voluntary disclosure
ofmore important than sodium then

information and the amounts of nutrients in

Grossman's model would be supported in

these foods. Grossman's thesis was not sup-five additional food groups: desserts, entrees,
ported for products within these groups. Incheese, juices, and soft drinks.
Overall, the results of the test of Grossaddition, the whole regressions were insignificant for baked goods, pasta sauces, and butter
man's model show that private quality signaland peanut butter and also did not support ing was not reliably at work in food markets
Grossman's model.
prior to implementation of mandatory nutriIn a further four food groups, cookies,
tion labeling. There was no clear, consistent
bacon, condiments, and salad dressings, the
pattern in what types of products within food
hypothesized quality signaling process groups
for
carried nutrition information panels
nutrient content can also be rejected. No
and consumers could not reliably assume that
nutrient content variables were statistically
a product without a nutrition information
significant in these groups. For cookies the
panel had a poorer nutrition profile.
estimated coefficient on price was statistically
significant and positive which suggests that in

this food group price (manufacturers' costs)
Conclusions
had a significant and positive effect on the
probability of nutrition information panels
being present on packages. When the priceThis
of study investigated the effectiveness of
markets
in providing information to concookies was higher the probability of labeling
sumers
on
the nutritional quality of processed
for their nutritional quality was also higher.
foods.
Grossman's
model of totally effective
For condiments the price variable was statissignaling was used to test whether
tically significant but negative. Price was quality
not
markets were effective in information provisignificant in explaining labeling probability
sion prior to implementation of the Nutrifor either bacon or salad dressings. On the

tion Labeling and Education Act of 1990.
other hand, in the oils group the fat content
Our data set allowed quantification of the
had a significant but positive effect on the
quality of food products by meaprobability of information disclosure and nutritional
the
their nutritional characteristics. It also
price variable was statistically significant suring
but
allowed estimation of the effect of these
negative. Overall, the hypothesized pattern of
nutritional characteristics on the probability
quality signaling was not supported by our
of voluntary information disclosure.
data in these five food groups.
For eight other food groups, desserts,According to Grossman's model, voluntary

information provision on the nutritional qualentrees, meats, cheese, soup, vegetables, juices,

and soft drinks, the results are inconclu-ity of processed foods would have been effective if higher quality products had nutrition
sive because, for example, one undesirable
information panels on their packages and
nutrient had a negative effect and another
with lower quality did not. In this case
undesirable nutrient had a positive or those
no
consumers would be able to distinguish the
effect on the probability of information disnutritional quality of food products at the
closure. Also within the soup group the fat

and sodium content variables were not statis-

point of purchase. With effective private qual-

ity signaling, government regulation of nutritically significant; however, the protein varition labeling would be unnecessary.
able was statistically significant and positive.
To be able to provide more conclusive results Our test of a model of totally effective
quality signaling provided mixed
for these groups it would be necessary nutritional
to
results from one food group to another.
rank nutrients according to their importance
For example, within the four food groups
within a group. For example, if we rank fat

of salted snacks, cereal, yogurt, and maras more important than sodium the qualand spreads there was no relationity signaling thesis would be supported garine
in

the desserts, entrees, meats, and cheese food
ship between voluntary nutritional labeling
groups. If we rank fiber higher than sodium
and the nutritional profile of food products
then the results would be consistent with

because almost all products were labeled

Grossman's model for vegetables. If we conregardless of their nutritional profiles. While
sider protein as more important than fatnot
anddirectly supporting the Grossman model,
sodium then Grossman's thesis would be supthese food groups could be viewed as havported for the soup group. If we evaluate
ing relatively effective quality signaling in
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